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Taryn Vian1 ID , Rachel M. Fong2* ID , Jeanette L. Kaiser2 ID , Misheck Bwalya3, Viviane I.R. Sakanga4, Thandiwe 
Ngoma3 ID ,  Nancy A. Scott2 ID
Abstract
Background: Community-led governance can ensure that leaders are accountable to the populations they serve and strengthen 
health systems for maternal care. A key aspect of democratic accountability is electing respective governance bodies, in this 
case community boards, and holding public meetings to inform community members about actions taken on their behalf. 
After helping build and open 10 maternity waiting homes (MWHs) in rural Zambia as part of a randomized controlled trial, 
we assisted community governance committees to plan and execute annual meetings to present performance results and, 
where needed, to elect new board members. 
Methods: We applied a principally qualitative design using observation and analysis of written documentation of public 
meetings to answer our research question: how do governance committees enact inward transparency and demonstrate 
accountability to their communities. The analysis measured participation and stakeholder representation at public meetings, 
the types and purposes of accountability sought by community members as evidenced by questions asked of the governance 
committee, and responsiveness of the governance committee to issues raised at public meetings. 
Results: Public meetings were attended by 6 out of 7 possible stakeholder groups, and reports were generally transparent. 
Stakeholders asked probing questions focused mainly on financial performance. Governance committee members were 
responsive to questions raised by participants, with 59% of answers rated as fully or mostly responsive (showing understanding 
of and answering the question). Six of the 10 sites held elections to re-elect or replace governance committee members. Only 
2 sites reached the target set by local stakeholder committees of 50% female membership, down from 3 at formation. To 
further improve transparency and accountability, community governance committees need to engage in advance preparation 
of reports, and should consult with stakeholders on broader measures for performance assessment. Despite receiving training, 
community-level governance committees lacked understanding of the strategic purpose of open public meetings and 
elections, and how these relate to democratic accountability. They were therefore not motivated to engage in tactics to manage 
stakeholders effectively. 
Conclusion: While open meetings and elections have potential to enhance good governance at the community level, 
continuous training and mentoring are needed to build capacity and enhance sustainability.
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Implications for policy makers
• Strengthening health systems to foster community-level governance can lead to improved maternal, neonatal and child health, and open public 
meetings and elections are an important aspect of shared control and accountability.
• Meeting participation, stakeholder representation, community engagement, and responsiveness of the governance committees are key indicators 
of transparency and accountability through open meetings and elections.
• Capacity building for community-level governance and accountability is a long-term process. Governments and development partners should 
anticipate the need for ongoing training and mentorship to implement such structures for maternity waiting homes (MWHs). This is necessary 
to improve the likelihood that community governance will be sustained.
Implications for the public
Local people who serve on governance committees for health programs such as maternity waiting homes (MWHs), need to explain to the rest of 
the community how they make decisions and use money. This can happen during open community meetings where anyone can share opinions, ask 
questions, and get answers.  At these open meetings, people should vote to re-elect committee members who are doing a good job or replace committee 
members who are not. This is democratic accountability, and it can be a way to assure that the people meant to represent community interests really 
are doing that. It can take a long time for this process to work smoothly, and will require a lot of effort and possibly some outside assistance. But over 
time,  governance committees can become more accountable to the people, and health outcomes can improve.
Key Messages 
Vian et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–132
Background
Strengthening health systems to foster community 
engagement and empowerment can lead to improved 
maternal, neonatal and child health.1-3 An important aspect 
of strengthening community participation is assuring good 
governance, systems of “shared control” and accountability.1,4 
Community-led governance helps ensure that leaders 
are answerable and accountable to the populations they 
serve.5,6 Those in a position of authority—community 
leaders—are obligated to provide information about or 
justification for their actions to other community members, 
and should face consequences if they fail to respond to the 
needs and concerns of their constituencies.7 Community 
leaders can include traditional authorities, religious figures, 
representatives of secular government at the local level, and 
members of established community groups, such as local 
school councils or health committees. Although many studies 
have documented mechanisms to improve accountability for 
maternal and newborn care at the national or health facility 
level, few have focused specifically on mechanisms to hold 
community-level committee members accountable.8,9 
Two key aspects of accountability are holding elections, 
and holding open public meetings so that policies are 
informed and overseen/questioned by broad discussion 
and agreement.10 In many settings, democratically-elected 
community members are more likely to gain public trust and 
acceptance of decisions.10-12 Through public meetings, leaders 
have an opportunity to interact with people they represent, 
and citizens can convey opinions and influence agendas.13 
The implementation challenges of community-led 
governance are not well understood. Studies have focused 
on the internal operations of governance boards,14 and how 
the boards may influence organizational strategies and 
outcomes,15-17 but few studies examine election processes 
or “inward transparency” facilitated through community 
governance structures,18 that is, enabling the community 
to see into the organization through open meetings and 
interactions with board members. An analysis of nonprofit 
boards, which often involve community members, may 
provide insights to lack of inward transparency. For example, 
a study of 300 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
Uganda found that 90% of NGOs had a board overseeing 
activities, and 80% claimed that they prepared an annual 
report and financial statement; however, many NGOs were 
not up-to-date in their reporting.19 Moreover, while virtually 
all the NGOs claimed to hold public meetings with members 
or beneficiaries, researchers suspected that only a few NGOs 
actually circulated figures and reports that were accurate, 
detailed and current.19 In Bangladesh, researchers found that 
lack of pragmatic planning, weak training of governance 
committee members, and poor communication with the larger 
community hindered community participation at meetings.6 
In addition, issues of power asymmetry lessen the likelihood 
that female committee members, or low status members of the 
community at large, will speak up.4 Community governance 
structures need to facilitate sharing of information across 
hierarchies, and to assure context-specific representation of 
different interests.8,20 
This article adds to our understanding of inward 
transparency and its relationship to accountability through 
a case study of community governance of maternity waiting 
homes (MWHs) in Zambia. MWHs are residential facilities 
located next to a health facility where a pregnant woman can 
stay during the final weeks of her pregnancy. The Maternity 
Homes Access in Zambia Project was a randomized controlled 
trial designed to measure the impact of a quality MWH 
model on facility delivery among women living farthest (≥10 
km) from their designated health facility in rural Zambia.21 In 
addition to improving the MWH infrastructure and providing 
linkages to primary health services, including skilled delivery 
care, the project helped to increase community participation 
and ownership. With extensive local consultation, a new 
locally-led governance structure was created to strengthen 
capacity and increase accountability. Consultation was 
required to better understand and integrate the new 
governance responsibilities with any existing structures for 
decision-making in the communities, such as neighborhood 
health committees and the traditional chiefdom leadership 
structures (as described in the Methods section).
A governance committee with an average of 9.3 members 
was established at each of the 10 study sites. Each governance 
committee included an executive committee (chair, vice chair, 
treasurer, and secretary). The governance committee was 
responsible for setting policies and strategies to promote the 
MWH mission and for overseeing policy implementation in 
the interest of the beneficiaries and the community at large. 
The governance committee was also responsible for mobilizing 
and using community resources for the sustainability of the 
MWH. This included oversight to safeguard MWH assets 
and ensuring that financial reports accurately presented its 
financial condition. 
After the MWHs had operated for about 24 months, project 
staff assisted the governance committees to plan and execute 
an annual general meeting (AGM) to present financial and 
performance results to the larger community and, where 
needed, to elect new board members. This study examines the 
experience of holding the first AGMs and elections in the 10 
sites between February and March 2018. Our objective is to 
explore whether the governance committees practiced inward 
transparency and were held accountable through elections 
and open public meetings, and to examine the barriers and 
facilitators to open meetings and election processes as a 
strategy for good governance of the local committees. 
Theoretical Frameworks
We used 2 theoretical frameworks to guide our study. First, 
we applied Andrews and Shaw’s framework of good local 
governance to guide the establishment of the governance 
committees. The elements of Andrews and Shaw’s framework 
include: (1) conform to legislation; (2) maintain fiscal health; 
(3) do the right things (responsive); (4) do them in the right 
way (efficient); and (5) be accountable to constituents for 
process, outputs, and outcomes.21 
In addition, we used Derick Brinkerhoff ’s health governance 
framework (Table 1), to code and analyze questions raised at 
the AGMs, by type and purpose of accountability.7 Brinkerhoff 
Vian et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–13 3
includes 3 types of accountability: financial, performance, 
and democratic/political accountability. All 3 types of 
accountability refer to adherence to policies, procedures, 
norms and standards for proper use of authority. Financial 
accountability focuses on controlling and reporting use of 
financial resources and making progress toward sustainability; 
performance accountability considers documented results 
compared to plans, and institutional learning to support 
effective services; and democratic/political accountability 
focuses on representation, legitimacy, and responsiveness to 
community needs. An important part of democratic/political 
accountability is to engage stakeholders.8 It is important 
for community members to engage in discussion and ask 
questions at the AGM. In this way, they can assess whether 




Community governance structures were established in 10 
randomly selected primary health facility study sites in the 
rural districts of Choma, Kalomo, and Pemba of Southern 
province; and Nyimba district of Eastern province. Further 
information on the study site eligibility criteria and random 
selection process can be found elsewhere.21 The rural health 
facility catchment area population sizes range from 5000 to 
11 000 with an average of 49 villages, each an average 9.7 km 
from the health facility.
In setting up the governance structures, the project worked 
with local stakeholders, including traditional and secular 
government leaders. The goal was to ensure local ownership 
of design decisions that would set initial guidelines for the 
structures. Zambia has a traditional leadership structure based 
on chiefdoms with their own set of geographical boundaries 
that exists outside of the secular government structures. The 
chief is considered the custodian of the natural resources, 
facilitator of social development for their people, responsible 
for settling disputes among their people, and guardian of 
traditional norms, culture, beliefs and values. Individuals 
living within a chiefdom are subjects of the chief, which is 
a hereditary position. The traditional leader within each 
village, the village headman, is accountable to the chief and 
responsible for carrying out the chief ’s duties at the village 
level. There are multiple levels of leaders between chiefs 
and village headmen, including senior headmen, section 
chairmen, and chief ’s representatives. Traditional leaders in 
Zambia have routinely been engaged in MCH programs and 
are seen as local champions. The policies they put in place can 
impact community actions: for example, in some localities, 
traditional leaders require women to make a payment to the 
chief if they have a home delivery (this is meant to encourage 
facility-based deliveries).22
Separate from the traditional leadership structure is the 
secular government structures, the lowest level of which is 
the ward, led by an elected civic councilor. Wards and their 
associated secular government structures are aggregated 
into constituencies, districts and provinces, and then at the 
national level.
Background on the Intervention
Governance Committee Structures and Initial Capacity 
Building
To assure that we met Andrews and Shah’s first criteria for 
good governance (conform to legislation), we made efforts 
to adhere to the formal rules for managing a collaborative in 
Zambia, as well as respecting the informal customs of starting a 
community-owned facility within a chiefdom. We investigated 
local regulations to ensure that committees had legal status 
and were properly registered. Consulting widely to determine 
who was influential in the community,23 project staff created 
short-term, district-level steering committees composed of 
traditional chiefs, health facility staff, ministry officials, local 
community leaders, and reproductive-aged women, and 
identified some decisions the committees should consider, 
such as establishing terms of reference for the governance 
committees and processes for member selection. Aligned 
with stakeholder steering committee recommendations, 
project staff then facilitated the formation of the governance 
committees at each study site. The stakeholder steering 
committees advised that governance committees should have 
Table 1. Theoretical Accountability Framework Guiding the Analysis of the AGMs
Accountability Type Purpose
Financial: proper recording, disbursement, and use of 
financial resources
•	 Adhere to policies and procedures for record keeping and financial controls; prepare 
proper and timely reports
•	 Control costs; control waste and corruption
•	 Ensure progress toward financial stability
Performance: support management and effective 
service delivery
•	 Adhere to policies, procedures, norms and values
•	 Document performance
•	 Compare results to targets and report reasons for variance
•	 Organizational learning; question if goals should change
Democratic/political: ensure responsible officials 
deliver on promises and respond to the needs of 
constituents
•	 Ensure community satisfaction with results achieved
•	 Ensure representativeness and legitimacy of governance committee members vis à vis 
constituents (elections)
•	 Adhere to procedures, norms, values and proper use of authority
Abbreviation: AGMs, annual general meetings.
Framework adapted from Brinkerhoff’s analytic framework for mapping accountability.7
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representation from villages in the health facility catchment 
area, community health workers, health facility staff, and 
traditional leadership; they emphasized a minimum of 50% 
female representation, in an effort to assure that structures 
meant to improve women’s health could have leadership 
representative of the target population. Each site was given 
the flexibility to adapt recommended guidelines and establish 
their own criteria for committee membership. For example, 
one committee decided to hold quarterly stakeholder 
meetings instead of only holding one annual meeting. Project 
staff monitored the process. Governance committees were 
created between January and May 2016, after which the initial 
steering committees were dissolved. Project staff helped each 
governance committee to choose a management unit, usually 
an individual or several individuals in charge of day-to-day 
MWH management. 
To meet Andrews and Shah’s other criteria (fiscal health, 
responsiveness, efficiency, and accountability), project staff 
provided training to governance committee and management 
unit members in management and financial skills. Committee 
and management unit members also attended 2 lesson-
learned workshops and project staff conducted routine 
mentorship visits over 24 months. Additionally, project staff 
supported sites to develop MWH operating systems, including 
a financial system, described in further detail elsewhere.24 
To further reinforce fiscal health and sustainability, project 
staff helped the sites to choose income-generating activities 
(IGAs). The project provided resources and training for a 
tailoring business to all sites, and one additional business of 
their choosing (raising goats, running an agricultural supply 
store, or running a grinding mill). After paying expenses of 
the IGA, the profit from the IGA was put in a bank account 
by the committee treasurer. These funds were available to pay 
operating expenses of the MWH. The governance committee 
provided oversight through 3 subcommittees: MWH 
operations, Finance, and IGA oversight. The subcommittees 
included 2-3 committee members, and met periodically to 
discuss specific issues related to their content areas.
Annual General Meetings and Elections
To reinforce democratic accountability, we created ways for 
the committees to gather community input. We asked each 
site to hold an AGM after at least one full year of operation, 
and a re-election of committee members. The open meeting 
approach promotes transparency and allows communities to 
hold the governance committee accountable for having used 
their power and resources wisely. In advance, the governance 
committees in each site held meetings to identify stakeholders 
to invite and set the meeting agenda. Each site was asked to 
create an activity report to document the MWH’s activities 
and results, and a financial report to document financial 
performance of the MWH and IGAs; these reports were to 
be discussed at the preparatory meeting and presented to the 
community at the AGM.
Study Design
We applied a mainly qualitative study design using observation 
and analysis of written documentation. Two members of our 
project team observed the meetings held in 9 MWH sites 
(due to timing, the team was unable to attend the meeting in 
one site). The project team members took handwritten notes 
that were later transcribed. We also reviewed the minutes 
and attendance register of the meeting where observers were 
not present, and reviewed reports of follow-up meetings 
organized at selected sites. We refer to sites by letter (A, B, etc) 
to maintain confidentiality.
To assess democratic accountability, we analyzed meeting 
participation and stakeholder representation, transparency of 
the reporting and election processes, stakeholder engagement, 
responsiveness of committees, and change in committee 
composition. 
Meeting Participation and External Stakeholder Representation
We calculated median attendance from sign-in sheets. We 
identified 7 possible external stakeholder groups (traditional 
leadership, health facility staff, health volunteers, church 
representatives, school staff, government officials, and other 
regular community members; described in Supplementary 
file 1) who had been invited to attend the AGM. We 
calculated the percent represented at the meeting by at least 
1 attendee per group. If an individual represented 2 groups, 
the chairperson asked that he or she only state one group. 
Calculations of participation proportions, medians, and 
ranges for stakeholder groups in attendance were conducted 
in Microsoft® Excel. 
We excluded the 86 members of the governance 
committees and MWH management units. While they are 
also stakeholders, we were primarily interested in examining 
the inward direction of transparency (when those outside 
an organization can see what is going on within). In this 
sense, we considered the governance committee members 
and MWH management unit staff to be insiders, rather than 
external stakeholders. 
Transparency of Reporting and the Election Processes
We assessed the transparency of reporting through review 
of 3 documents that were intended to be presented at each 
meeting: the AGM Agenda, Financial Report, and Activity 
Report. We measured conformance to the standards 
enumerated in training and discussed during preparatory 
meetings (see Supplementary file 2). The agenda and activity 
reports each had 10 standards (for example, the agenda 
needed to include time for opening remarks, presentation and 
discussion of each specific report, while the activity report 
needed to include the reporting period, planned activities, 
implemented activities, challenges). The financial report had 
5 standards (for example, the report should include a list of 
types and amounts of income, profit and loss statement). 
Each standard was rated as ‘yes’ (present) or ‘no’ (absent). 
Mean transparency scores for each domain were calculated in 
Microsoft® Excel.
For election transparency, we observed whether the site had 
articulated to the stakeholders the criteria for nominating and 
selecting committee members, and how the election process 
would work. We also observed whether an election was held. 
If it was not, we asked committee members for the reason. 
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Stakeholder Engagement 
To measure stakeholder engagement, we reviewed the written 
meeting notes and extracted 67 questions asked by external 
stakeholders at the 9 meetings. We coded these questions 
according to the type of accountability (financial, performance, 
democratic) and the purpose of accountability, using our 
theoretical framework. Two researchers independently coded 
all questions, then met to discuss and reconcile areas of 
disagreement. We added one additional accountability type, 
“Information,” to code simple questions asked by participants 
about the basic structure of the MWH and its associated 
IGA. Examples of informational questions include “What 
does ‘IGA’ stand for?” and “Who are the members of the 
governance committee?” When questions fell into more than 
one category, we coded them to both categories. 
Responsiveness of Governance Committee
We analyzed how the governance committee members 
answered questions posed by external stakeholders by 
looking for 3 criteria: demonstrated understanding of the 
question, a straightforward and clear answer, and justification 
or additional detail to support the answer. One researcher 
coded each answer according to these 3 criteria, rating 
individual criteria as not responsive, somewhat responsive, 
mostly responsive, or fully responsive. The researcher then 
assigned an overall responsiveness rating (Table 2). For the 
response to be considered fully responsive, the respondent 
must have shown an understanding of the question, provided 
a straightforward, clear answer, and provided justification 
or detail in relation to the question. A second researcher 
reviewed the coding and the 2 researchers discussed and 
resolved areas of disagreement. We excluded 5 questions that 
sounded more like suggestions.
Governance Committee Composition
Project staff collected a register of governance committee 
membership which included basic demographics at the time of 
committee formation and approximately 24 months later, just 
after the AGMs and re-elections. The governance committee 
terms of reference state that a member shall be elected to a 
term of 12 months of service. However, the first AGMs were 
held at 24 months because the MWHs did not open until 6 
months after committee formation and the IGAs were not 
operational until 12 months after committee formation. 
Proportions were calculated for respondent gender, health 
facility representation, traditional leadership representation, 
and members’ occupation. Means and standard deviations 
were calculated for committee members, highest grade 
completed, and overall female representation. All calculations 
were conducted in Microsoft® Excel. Approximately 12% of 
all committee members over the 2 time points were missing 
data on the highest grade they completed in school.
Some project staff provided technical assistance, as well 
as engaging in research. This may have introduced observer 
bias, when the researcher subconsciously projects his/
her expectations onto the research. To limit this bias, the 2 
researchers who analyzed data on transparency, stakeholder 
engagement, and responsiveness were not involved in on-the-
ground activities.
Results
Initial Committee Selection and Composition
Table 3 reflects the composition and characteristics of the 
governance committees upon their formation and after the 
AGMs approximately 24 months later. The communities 
initially selected committee members in one of 3 ways: (1) 
Community elections wherein community members selected 
from a list of candidates nominated by the stakeholder steering 
committee (n = 4 ); (2) Village headmen (traditional leaders) 
nominations, the headmen identified candidates based on 
qualification criteria from the stakeholder steering committee 
(n = 3); or (3) Health facility staff identified and selected 
members based on their geographic representativeness, 
availability, and prior involvement in health facility-related 
activities (n = 3).
Upon initial formation, the governance committees had an 
average of 9.3 members. The average proportion of female 
members per committee was 39%, with 3 of the 10 sites 
having at least 50% female representation on the committee. 
No sites using the community election method to select 
the governance committees achieved the 50% minimum 
target, while the majority of sites that used health facility 
appointments achieved the 50% target. Seven of the 10 sites 
had representation from traditional leadership, and 100% of 
sites had at least one health facility representative. Fifty percent 
of sites also had a clergy member on the committee, while the 
majority of the remaining members were subsistence farmers 
(data not shown). 
Annual General Meeting Participation and Representation 
On average, 36.2 external stakeholders attended the AGM 
at each site. Mean attendance per site included about 15.2 
Table 2. Responsiveness Rating Used to Systematically Assess Governance Committee Responses to Stakeholder Questions at the AGMs
Responsiveness Rating Criteria
Not responsive Did not show understanding of question, did not provide straight forward or clear answer, did not provide justification or detail.
Somewhat Showed understanding of question, and partly answered the question. Answer may have been unclear or lacked justification or detail.
Mostly Showed understanding of question, and answered the question. The answer may have lacked clarity or some justification.
Fully Shows understanding of question, provided straight forward, clear answer, and provided justification or detail in relation to the question.
Abbreviation: AGMs, annual general meetings.
Vian et al
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Table 3. Characteristics of Governance Committees at Formation and 24 Months Later, by Site and Overall (n = 10)
Overall Mean (SD) Site A Site B Site C Site D Site E Site F Site G Site H Site I Site J





















Number of GC members 9.3 (1.7) 9 10 7 6 9 10 12 10 10 10
Female representation, No. (%)a 39.3 (10.9) 3 (33.3) 3 (30.0) 2 (28.6) 2 (33.3) 4 (44.4) 5 (50.0) 4 (33.3) 3 (30.0) 5 (50.0) 6 (60.0)
Traditional leadership representation, 
No. (%)a 8.6 (6.9) 0 (0.0) 1 (10.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (16.6) 1 (11.1) 0 (0.0) 1 (8.3) 1 (10.0) 1 (10.0) 2 (20.0)
Highest grade completed, mean (SD) 9.6 (2.4)b 11.4 (2.2)c 9.7 (2.5) 9.1 (2.0) 10.3 (1.9)d 9.4 (2.8) 11.0 (2.0) 10.3 (2.0) 9.3 (1.8) 8.6 (2.3) 8.7 (2.7)
24 Months After Formation
Re-election results n/a Nore-election

















Elected some new 
members
Number of GC members 9.3 (1.6) 6 10 10 9 8 10 12 9 10 9
Female representation, No. (%)a 37.7 (8.4) 2 (33.3) 4 (40.0) 3 (30.0) 3 (33.3) 3 (37.5) 5 (50.0) 3 (25.0) 4 (44.4) 5 (50.0) 3 (33.3)
Traditional leadership representation, 
No. (%)a 6.33 (8.9) 0 (.) 1 (10.0) 2 (20.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (11.1) 0 (0.0) 2 (22.2)
Highest grade completed, mean (SD) 9.9 (2.4)e 10.5 (2.5) 10.3 (2.8) 9.5 (1.9) 11.4 (1.1) 9.8 (2.9) 11.0 (1.7) 10.4 (1.8)f 9.7 (2.1) 9.4 (2.3) 7.8 (3.8)g
Abbreviations: SD, standard deviation; GC, Governance Committee.
a Mean proportion for all 10 sites for female representation and traditional leadership (n = 10); b Missing 6.6% of data (n = 6); c Missing 44.4% of data (n = 4); d Missing 33.3% of data (n = 2); e Missing 5.3% of data (n=5); f Missing 16.7% of 
data (n=2); g Missing 33.3% of data (n = 3).
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representatives of traditional leadership (headmen, senior 
headmen, chief representatives, and section chairmen); 11.3 
health volunteers (including members of Neighborhood 
Health Committee, Safe Motherhood Action Group, and 
community health workers); 2.5 church representatives; 
1.4 teachers; 0.5 local government representatives; and 
3.4 other local community members (eg, farmers, people 
without a listed occupation; Figure 1). The median number 
of stakeholder groups represented per site was 6 out of the 
possible 7 groups (range: 4-7).
Report Transparency
Table 4 shows the transparency of reporting against the 
standards.
•	 Agenda. The mean score for agenda transparency 
was 7.6 out of 10. Meeting preliminaries such as self-
introductions and opening remarks were a common 
feature in all sites. All sites also included time to present 
and discuss the financial report, and 9 of 10 sites included 
time to present and discuss the activity report.
•	 Activity report. The mean transparency score for the 
activity report was 6.3 out of 10. Eight sites had a written 
report available at the meeting, one site (J) provided a 
verbal report only, and one site (F) did not provide either 
written or verbal. All committee members were literate 
and sites were capable of written reporting. Most sites 
described implemented activities, but only one site (C) 
compared actual to planned activities and explained why 
some activities were not implemented.
•	 Financial report. The median score was 4 out of 5. All 
sites included the reporting period, and all but one 
included sources of revenue and expenditure. Only 3 sites 
calculated profit or loss.
Two sites gave verbal financial and activity reports, and left 
out many components in their verbal presentations. Written 
reports were generally more complete. All sites except one 
voted at the AGM to accept the activity report. Eight of 10 
sites voted to accept the financial report. In the sites that did 
not accept reports, they asked the chairperson or treasurer 
to revise the report to include more detail, and held an extra 
meeting to vote on the report. 
Election Transparency
The election process was transparent in 6 out of 10 sites. 
These were characterized by clear explanations given to 
stakeholders for how the election process would work, and 
clear criteria presented to community members on how they 
should think about nominating and voting for governance 
committee members. Two sites (D, G) used a community 
selection process (wherein community members select from 
a list of people nominated during the meeting), and 2 sites 
used a 2-staged selection process involving headmen, who 
first gave their recommendations before the community 
selection process took place (B, E). Finally, 2 sites used a 
2-staged process where health facility staff first selected an 
agreed upon number of old governance committee members 
who would be retained, before opening the other slots to 








































Figure 1. External Stakeholder Participation at Annual General Meetings.
Notes: See Supplementary file 1 for further explanation of stakeholders’ role in community health and development. Traditional Leadership grouping includes chief 
representatives, senior headmen, headmen, and section chairmen; Health Volunteers includes members of the Neighborhood Health Committee, Safe Motherhood 
Action Group, and community health workers; Government includes civic counselor at ward level; Other community members includes farmers and those who did not 
state occupation or affiliation.
Table 4. Transparency of 10 MWH Reports Presented at Annual General Meetings
 Actual Average Points Total Possible Points Average Score ( Average Points/possible) Actual Range
Meeting Agenda 7.6 10 76% 5-10
Activity (Chairperson's) report 6.3 10 63% 0-10
Financial (Treasurer's) report 4 5 80% 1-5
Abbreviation: MWH, maternity waiting home.
Note: See Supplementary file 2 for the criteria. Each criterion was worth 1 point.
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new members took place, diverse groups of stakeholders were 
present (median: 5.5 stakeholder groups represented, range: 
4-7). 
Sites A and F did not hold elections because the membership 
of the governance committee is tied to the Neighborhood 
Health Committee (see Supplementary file 1) election process 
and driven by different timing; site H did not have selection 
criteria, so they postponed elections; and site C decided it was 
too soon to hold elections. 
In general, the governance committee secretary was 
responsible for inviting stakeholders to the AGM. In 2 sites 
(B and I), the only stakeholders invited to the AGM were 
traditional leaders. Other community stakeholders such as 
health volunteers, an important cohort of potential candidates 
for the governance committee, did not know about the 
meeting. As a result, although some additional stakeholders 
did find out about the AGM, few people expressed interest in 
being a candidate for election. The committees at these sites 
decided to hold another AGM 2 weeks later, at which all key 
stakeholders were present to elect the new committee. 
Table 3 and the next section on committee composition 
after elections detail how the membership of the committees 
changed with the elections.
Committee Composition After Elections
Site B elected a completely new set of committee members, 
while site E re-elected all the old members. Four sites (D, G, 
I, and J) re-elected some current committee members but 
replaced others. The average number of committee members 
remained consistent at 9.3 after re-elections. Average female 
representation on the committees remained virtually the same 
(39% at formation, 38% after elections); however, only 2 sites 
reached 50% female membership, down from 3 at formation. 
The number of committees with traditional leadership 
representation also decreased from 7 to 4. All sites retained 
representation from their associated health centers. 
Stakeholder Engagement
Table 5 illustrates types of questions asked according to the type 
of accountability they may have helped to promote. Most of the 
questions related to financial issues (43%), and accountability 
for program performance (28%). Twelve percent of the 
questions were categorized as democratic accountability, that 
is, questioning how well the representatives were exercising 
proper authority on behalf of the community. The remainder 
of the questions (16%) were more informational in nature, 
where people just wanted to understand how many people 
were on the committee, or whether someone was being paid. 
Two questions were about topics not specific to the MWH: for 
example, one observer asked when the health center would 
receive a replacement for the clinical officer, and another 
asked when staff housing construction would be completed. 
Table 5. Questions From External Stakeholders Asked at AGMs, by Type of Question and Purpose of Accountability
Type of Accountability Purpose of Accountability Question (Quote)
Financial
Adherence to policies, 
procedures, and proper 
reporting
"Do the tailors have a [bank] account, and is it a group or a personal account?"
"Headmen's contribution has not been mentioned. No matter how little it is, it would be 
important to know how much was received."
Cost control, reduce waste, 
prevent corruption
"Why do you buy stock from district A instead of district B which is nearby and could reduce on 
costs?"
"The figures for the workers are not adding up. According to your figures the workers are getting 
paid less than what you have reported."
Progress towards stability "Has the Governance Committee solicited for funding support from elsewhere?"
Performance
Adherence to policies and 
procedures "Do you have all the trading certificates for your business?"
Documentation of 
performance
"Have you evaluated the competency of the tailors after mentorship lessons to determine 
whether you are making progress or not?"
Comparison of performance 
results to targets "Your report said that the dip tank [for goat rearing] is leaking. What is the way forward?"
Organizational learning "The IGA should consider reducing the prices. Market research should be done and check what the prices around are. At the moment your prices are a bit high." 
Democratic
Satisfaction/responsiveness "Why have you not implemented the headmen's resolution as was agreed in last quarter's meeting, that maize bran should be given back to customers?"
Representativeness "The Agenda states that we are supposed to have elections. Why should we have elections when the current Governance Committee has been trained and they are doing a great job?"
Transparency "Why have you prioritized the construction of the verandah at the expense of the toilet, given the cholera situation?"
Adherence and proper use of 
authority
"Why do you have same people in both the governance committee and the sub-committees? We 
all want to be part of the committee!"
Information Understanding procedure “When did the tuck-shop open?”
Abbreviations: AGMs, annual general meetings; IGA, income-generating activity.
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As the committee answered these questions, they were coded 
under performance accountability.
Responsiveness of Committee
Table 6 illustrates answers rated as fully, mostly, somewhat, or 
not responsive to questions. Governance committee members 
generally had a good understanding of the questions posed by 
external stakeholders. About 40% of the responses were fully 
responsive, and an additional 19% were mostly responsive. At 
times, responses were convoluted or only partially answered 
the question. Some governance committee members had 
difficulty responding to questions in sites where they either 
had not prepared written reports, or where the member 
presenting the report was not the same person who had 
Table 6. Examples of Governance Committee Answers to Questions Asked by External Stakeholders at AGMs, by Level of Responsiveness
Question Answer Observation
Fully Responsive
You mentioned that you have registered 
as a cooperative. Who are the members 
to that cooperative? (Site D)
When registering, we register the GC as the 
executive for the Cooperative; however, the 
membership for the cooperative is the community.
Directly and clearly answered the question, providing 
detail about the role of GC as executive.
Are there responsibilities for the waiting 
mothers and their companion that we 
need to know? There are complaints that 
the mother is being given a lot of work. 
(Site H)
The MU’s role is to supervise the mothers while 
they are staying here. It is the responsibility of the 
waiting mothers and their companions to keep 
the place clean and ensure that they wash the 
beddings when they are discharged.
Clearly explained the responsibilities of the mothers and 
gave information about the role of MU staff. Could have 
promised to watch for trends/other complaints. 
What made other headmen fail to honor 
their pledges [to support the MWH]? 
Were they reminded? How many failed to 
honor their pledges? (Site I)
20 out of 34 headmen honored their pledges. 
Reminders were sent to those who have not 
honored their pledges, but to no avail. The Health 
Centre Committee was mandated to follow-up with 
the other headmen.
Answered the question, although GC did not know the 
motivations of the headmen. A follow-up action was 
identified involving the Health Centre Committee.
Mostly Responsive
What was the cost of building the agro-
shop and tuck shop? [Answer: K2300]. 
Follow-up question: Is that the total 
amount? (Site G)
No, that only covers blocks and labour cost. The 
treasurer’ report has more details. Almost all 
building materials were donated by [the Project].
The question was eventually answered, but the 
participant needed to ask a follow-up question to 
understand that the cost was only partial.
Is your job as a GC member voluntary? 
(Site C) Yes, it is.
The answer might have explained others who are paid, 
eg, MU and/or IGA staff, or benefits GC members receive 
in-kind (training).
Are you making profit or loss at the 
hammer mill? (Site I)
Yes we are making profit, though we had. 
breakdown which led us to having more 
expenditures.
It is not entirely clear if the breakdown explains the size 
of profit, or if GC thinks hammer mill may not have a 
profit in the future.
Somewhat Responsive
It appears you recorded a decline in 
utilization [of the MWH] between 
December and January 2018. What could 
be the reason? (Site J)
Farming period could be the cause.
Answer gives a possible reason; however, explanation 
of the logical connection between farming and use of 
MWH would be helpful. GC could also mention normal 
variability in data.
How much money have you incurred 
in the losses? What is the rationale of 
proposing to increase the salaries of the 
workers when you are incurring losses? 
(Site H)
The workers have been working for a year and so 
we are proposing, like in any other organization, 
that there is a yearly increase. The increment is a 
way of motivating the workers – it is still a plan and 
it can be shot down.
Did not answer first part of question regarding losses. Did 
not show an understanding that funds must be available 
in order to raise salaries.
Your report said that the dip tank is 
leaking, what is the way forward? (Site C) At the moment goats are being sprayed.
Answer explains the short-term solution to the problem, 
but does not explain how the problem will be resolved in 
future.
Not Responsive
How will the GC as a cooperative be 
reporting to PACRA? (Site C)
It is important to register with PACRA because we 
shall be selling goats in bulk.
Did not answer question about the type of reporting 
required.
Your report is confusing because it is 
mixing income and expenditure at the 
same time (Site B)
Yes, I have misplaced the original report. So this 
was hurriedly done for this meeting.
Did not explain steps that would be taken to find out the 
answer to the question.
The figures for the workers are not adding 
up. According to your figures, the workers 
are getting paid less than what you have 
reported (Site H)
This could have be a result of miscalculation. Kindly 
allow us more time to work on a new financial 
report.
Did not explain how the GC will share the new financial 
report with the community. 
Abbreviations: GC, Governance Committee; IGA, income generating activity; MU, management unit; MWH, maternity waiting home; PACRA, Patents and 
Companies Registration Agency; AGMs, annual general meetings.
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prepared the report. This often led to long debates, especially 
related to finances.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to shed light on the structures and 
processes of community-led governance and accountability 
for a MWH intervention in rural Zambia. Specifically, we 
examined open public meetings facilitated by governance 
committees to see how they promoted “inward transparency,” 
that is, the ability for community members to see how 
community leaders were making decisions and managing 
resources to achieve goals for the public good. We also 
examined democratic accountability in terms of election of 
committee members.
We found that on average, many different stakeholders 
attended meetings, and reports were transparent. 
Stakeholders asked probing questions, especially about 
financial matters, and governance committee members were 
generally responsive to questions. Half the sites used elections 
to replace committee members, demonstrating democratic 
accountability. 
These findings are similar to Papp et al, who found 
that public hearings in Orissa, India, enhanced social 
accountability by providing participants with a safe space to 
describe their needs, and helped women and communities 
to see maternal health services as a right rather than a 
“kindness.”25 The public comment period at open meetings 
facilitates transparency in 2 ways. It allows officials to respond 
directly to citizen complaints, but it also raises topics that 
officials may report back on at a subsequent meeting.26 Given 
the timing of our study, we were unable to measure these less 
immediate transparency gains. The results of the elections 
to replace governance committee members in 5 sites also 
suggest enhanced social accountability. This is similar to 
findings in Uganda, where communities that participated 
in a monitoring intervention were more likely to replace 
governance committee members compared to control sites.27
While AGMs and elections worked generally as expected, 
the effectiveness of these specific governance activities in 
promoting inward transparency and accountability was 
handicapped by committee members’ lack of preparation for 
the AGM, a narrow focus on financial accountability, and 
failure of the committees to adopt a strategic performance 
management perspective. 
First, many committees did not perform as expected in 
preparing for the AGM. Collaboration for community well-
being depends on information sharing and mutual goals,28 and 
trust among the different stakeholders can help to harmonize 
individual interests with community needs.29 Yet, several 
governance committees had incomplete reports and seemed 
unprepared to answer questions, thus missing opportunities 
to increase understanding and trust within the community. 
In addition, lack of preparation meant that elections were 
not held in 4 of 10 sites, and where elections were held, the 
proportion of sites with 50% or more women on committees 
declined, as did representation of traditional leaders. The loss 
of representation by traditional leaders is significant as the 
leaders have influence at the village level and can promote use 
of MWHs. 
The second major factor inhibiting transparency and 
accountability was a narrow focus on financial accountability. 
External stakeholders asked few questions about non-
financial performance, such as the MWH’s ability to deliver 
quality services, the efficiency, or the committee’s success in 
promoting organizational growth. The lack of attention to 
performance transparency includes the failure to incorporate 
the perspectives of women who had stayed at the MWH. 
Performance data monitoring and review feature in the 
accountability framework proposed by the United Nations 
Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s 
and Children’s Health30 and can help guide service delivery 
improvements.9,31 Inclusion of the perspectives of key 
populations — for example, health service users and people 
living with or affected by disease — is a core governance 
principle of organizations like the Global Fund,32 the World 
Health Organization (WHO),33 and the World Bank.34 
Participatory approaches in health require power-sharing with 
health service users in order to be truly transformative.35,36 
Finally, the lack of strategic management perspective 
resulted in missed opportunities to promote accountability 
for responsive actions. For example, AGM participants 
asked specific questions about the tailoring IGA. While the 
committee members directly answered these questions, they 
missed the opportunity to lead the discussion at a higher 
level: the tailoring IGAs were less successful than other 
IGAs due to machines that kept breaking down, and there 
was too little demand for the finished products. The AGM 
could have been used to reevaluate whether the tailoring 
IGAs should be continued, given these challenges. In another 
example, one community member questioned why mothers 
or their companions had to help with cleaning while staying 
in the MWH. The committee member explained the current 
rationale, and the discussion moved on to another topic. 
Yet, this question points to a need to possibly reconsider the 
policy, or to sensitize community members about the need 
for volunteer assistance in managing the MWHs. Similarly, 
a stakeholder asked about monthly variation in MWH 
stays. The governance committee member related this to 
the farming season, implying that women are choosing not 
to go to the MWH in order to work in the fields. Yet, the 
governance committee missed the chance to discuss the 
broader implications for access to the MWH and skilled 
delivery during the farming season, and strategies to 
overcome barriers to use the homes during this time. Some 
of these barriers include having funds to purchase required 
items for the baby and mother during delivery, and having a 
relative at home to take care of other children.22,37-39 
Despite project-sponsored governance and financial 
trainings, as well as mentorship over a period of 24 months, 
more effort, or different approaches, were needed to increase 
the members’ capacity for community governance and 
accountability. Several factors could improve the open 
meeting and election process in the future and in other 
settings, including better meeting preparation and facilitation, 
strengthening performance data, and focused mentoring. 
These factors should be considered by policy-makers, 
Vian et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–13 11
program managers, and development partners interested in 
promoting community-owned MWHs. The factors may even 
help support the health services locally beyond the MWHs.
Preparing for Meetings and Meeting Facilitation
The project provided general guidelines for the AGM and 
preparatory meetings, but the committees required further 
normative guidance. Based on this experience, the project 
created written templates for the AGM Agenda, Activity, and 
Finance Reports (see Supplementary file 3), and a checklist 
of stakeholders to invite to the meeting. Written reporting 
templates can help ensure that key information is included. 
Program managers should assure that committee members 
understand the reports. A run-through of the meeting, using 
a set of possible questions derived from previous meetings, 
may be helpful. The members need to be prepared to explain 
their role, give more details behind decisions, and describe 
their vision for the future. Committee members also need 
to develop skills in how to anticipate questions and manage 
discussion among community members attending the public 
meetings. Holding a “mock” meeting as part of preparatory 
training, with project staff asking potentially contentious 
questions, could help committee members gain confidence, 
apply judgement, and develop meeting management skills.40,41
Strengthening Performance Data
It may be helpful to ask interested stakeholders to evaluate 
governance committee and MWH performance prior to the 
open public meeting and elections. This would better prepare 
meeting participants to discuss results and vote. Indicators 
for the governance committee could include governance 
committee members’ attendance at quarterly meetings, and 
existence of good meeting minutes. MWH performance 
metrics might include average length of stay, occupancy rate, 
and satisfaction ratings from women using it. This could 
help build a culture of organizational learning focused on 
opportunities for growth and change.42
Focused Mentoring
A barrier to democratic accountability in some sites was 
a lack of community understanding of the purpose of 
elections. In 2 communities, stakeholders wondered why 
elections were needed if the current governance committee 
was performing well. Methodologies for electing governance 
committee members were complicated by the difficulty 
of communication across the multiple villages served by 
each site. Technical assistance and mentoring provided by 
government or development partners may help contextually 
adapt the election models and assure deeper understanding 
of the governance committee’s roles and responsibilities. This 
is especially important as members are replaced through 
elections. Our analysis suggests that this technical assistance 
may be needed for a longer period than 24 months, with 
implications for program costs. A critical question is whether 
the extensive inputs in the committees are likely to be 
sustained if the donor funds are not available. Models for local 
technical assistance could be explored to extend mentoring 
for community leaders; for example, the Ministry of Health 
could partner with the Ministry of Community Development 
and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Gender. It is within the 
scope of influence of these government agencies to support 
and empower community and women leaders. 
The AGMs did not meet expectations related to 
representation of the views of women of reproductive age. 
None of the sites designed election processes that explicitly 
encouraged affirmative action with regard to gender 
representation. This is something to address in the future, 
perhaps through different models such as strengthening 
the role of health facility staff in MWH governance43 or 
incorporating user feedback interviews into AGM planning.44 
Researchers in Benin found that conducting personalized 
feedback interviews with women and their companions 
after receiving maternal care, helped women to overcome 
institutionalized norms of passivity and to redress injustices 
they experienced.36 The data thus obtained can be used to 
improve maternal care. Increasing the voice of users could 
increase democratic accountability by encouraging critical 
reflection on the part of the governance committee and 
providing motivation for change.36 
Additional research could explore other models of 
accountability in the context of community-governed 
MWHs. For example, McDonald argues that the qualities of 
commitment, cultural humility, and partnership are central 
to social accountability.45 These qualities are demonstrated 
when governance committee members are embedded in the 
community, are respectful of the mores of the local culture, 
and exhibit an egalitarian approach to solving problems 
together with the community. Longer-term research could 
try to measure how the governance committees exhibit these 
qualities over time, and how to strengthen them to further 
support social accountability.
Our study did not specifically examine the role of traditional 
leaders vis-à-vis other formal leaders in the establishment 
of the governance committees and in the oversight process. 
This would be an important area of exploration in future 
research. It is possible that involving traditional leaders more 
intentionally from the start could have strengthened the 
performance of the committees, though it is also possible that 
traditional leaders could exert coercive pressures on MWH 
governance decisions. Qualitative data from Zambia suggests 
that traditional leaders are imposing financial penalties on 
women who deliver at home.46 This was the case in Malawi, 
where traditional leaders supported maternal, newborn, and 
child health goals through a utilitarian, top-down model that 
included fear, coercion, and punishment as tools for policy 
implementation.47
Limitations 
This study had several limitations. In observing meetings, 
we were unable to record the gender, occupation, or other 
demographic information for citizens raising questions at 
meetings, so we cannot evaluate possible power imbalances 
that may have limited certain perspectives from being 
represented, a problem suggested in other studies.4 In 
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addition, using project staff as meeting observers may have 
introduced bias, as these staff had been mentoring the 
committees for several years. Their familiarity gave them 
background knowledge, but could have caused them to 
emphasize certain aspects of meetings or overlook others, 
based on the site. This limitation was somewhat mitigated 
by using checklists to evaluate transparency of documents, 
and by requiring staff to write down every question asked 
and answered. The study may also have been biased by the 
Hawthorne effect48: committee members may have changed 
their behavior in response to the interest or attention of the 
project staff who observed the annual meetings. Finally, the 
analysis is based primarily on project record review and the 
quality of the reports varied.
Conclusion
Our paper provides insights on the contextual conditions 
for implementation of community-level accountability 
interventions to increase internal transparency, something 
that has been lacking in other studies.9 The findings suggest 
that open public meetings and elections can be an effective 
mechanism to increase accountability for health institutions 
at the community level; however, governance committee 
members need support and mentorship to adequately 
prepare for and facilitate meetings and elections. The 
process of educating committee members and stakeholders 
to participate in community-led governance structures 
takes time and should not be seen as a one-time investment. 
Detailed study of open meetings can be helpful to reveal gaps 
in understanding of policies and performance, and the data 
collected can be used to develop contextually adapted training 
and leadership development programs going forward.
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